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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate law statutes determine the nature of the relationship between 
shareholders, the principal owners of the corporation, and the board of di­
rectors, those w ho run and operate the corporation. ' Under the Delaware 
* I would like to thank the Michigan Law Review, particularly the Notes Office for their 
endless help. I would also like to thank Professor Laura N. Beny for her many comments and in­
sights. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their support and my wonderful wife, Sana, for 
her lasting and unwavering love and encouragement. 
I. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Megasubsidiaries: The Effect of Corporate Structure on 
Corporate Control, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1577, 1588 (1971) ("A major function of the corporate stat­
utes is to allocate powers between shareholders and management."). 
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General Corporation Law ("DGCL"),2 many of the powers are delegated to 
the board of directors. More specifically, under section 141, "the business 
and affairs of every corporation . . .  [are] managed by or under the direction 
of a board of directors . . . .  "3 The Delaware courts have interpreted this pro­
vision by deferring to decisions by directors and their designated 
management under the business judgment rule, which presumes that in mak­
ing a business decision, the directors acted on an informed basis with a good 
faith, an honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.4 As many have noted, "[t] he effect of this presumption when ap­
plied by a court is that the court will not substitute its judgment for that of 
the board, unless it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
directors' decision involved a breach of fiduciary duty."5 
Despite the enormous delegation of power from shareholders to direc­
tors, shareholders still retain certain essential powers such as the right to 
vote on mergers 6 and to elect directors. 7 Among these is the right to vote on 
the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the corporation. Section 
271 of the DGCL provides that: 
Every corporation may at any meeting of its board of directors or govern­
ing body sell, lease or exchange all or substantially all of its property and 
assets . . .  as its board of directors or governing body deems expedient and 
for the best interests of the corporation, when and as authorized by a reso­
lution adopted by the holders of a majority of the outstanding stock of the 
corporation entitled to vote . . . .  8
In Gimbel v. The Signal Cos., Chancellor Quillen, writing for the Dela­
ware Court of Chancery, articulated the now often-cited Gimbel test, which 
considers both the quantitative and qualitative nature of the proposed asset 
sale in determining whether an asset sale constituted substantially all of the 
assets of a corporation.9 Chancellor Quillen explained that "[i]f the sale is of 
assets quantitatively vital to the operation of the corporation and is out of 
the ordinary and substantially affects the existence and purpose of the cor­
poration, then it is beyond the power of the Board of Directors." 10 
2. For the remainder of this Note, I will abbreviate Delaware General Corporation Law as 
DGCL. 
3. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
4. Smith v. Van G orkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("The business judgment rule is 
the offspring of the fundamental principle, codified in 8 Del.C. § 141 (a), that the business and af­
fairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of directors."). 
5. RODMAN WARD, JR. ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 
§ 141.2.2.1, at G CL-IV-34 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2006). 
6. Tit. 8, § 251 (c). 
7. ld. § 211.l. 
8. Id. § 271 (a) (emphasis added). 
9. 316A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974). 
IO. Id. at 606 (emphasis added). 
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Because the Gimbel test is not a mathematical, bright-line test, many of 
the issues litigated under section 271 relate to whether a proposed sale of 
assets unilaterally undertaken by the board is a sale of "substantially all of 
the assets" of the corporation and therefore requires a shareholder vote. 1 1  
Delaware courts have repeatedly dealt with this issue on a case-by-case ba­
sis.1 2  There is, however, one technical issue the Delaware courts have yet to 
completely resolve: whether a sale of substantially all of the assets of a sub­
sidiary which constitutes substantially all of the assets of the parent 
implicates a parent shareholder vote. Such an issue would arise if a parent 
corporation decided to sell its assets, which were placed within a subsidiary. 
The proposed assets to be sold, for the purposes of this Note, represent sub­
stantially all of the assets of the parent corporation. If the sale is conducted 
at the subsidiary level, does the sale only require a shareholder vote by the 
parent corporation, the record holder of the subsidiary's shares, or also a 
vote by the shareholders of the parent corporation who ultimately are the 
beneficiaries of the parent corporation?'3 Put another way, does a section 
271 transaction effectuated at the subsidiary level require a shareholder vote 
by the shareholders of the parent corporation or only the shareholders of the 
subsidiary? 
Until recently, the Delaware courts had summarily concluded that the 
only vote required was the vote of "the record holder of all of the shares," 
obviating the need to attain shareholder approval from shareholders of a 
parent corporation. 14 In J.P. Griffin Holding Corp. v. Mediatrics, Inc., the 
Delaware Court of Chancery concluded that because the defendant corpora­
tion was the record holder of all of the shares of its subsidiary and voted all 
of its shares in favor of the proposed sale, the requirements of section 271 
were met. 15 By implication, the court refused to construe section 271 to re­
quire shareholders of the parent corporation vote on the proposed asset sale. 
In the court's view, the section 271 subsidiary asset sale did not require 
shareholder approval by the shareholders of the parent corporation. A later 
case, Leslie v. Telephonies Office Technologies, Inc., avoided deciding a 
similar issue but noted that "more often than not, Delaware courts have up­
held the legal significance of corporate form, in a corporate-subsidiary 
1 ,, 1 6  comp ex . . . .  
11. See, e.g., Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 464 (Del. 1991); Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger 
Int'!, Inc., 858 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 2004); Katz v. Bregman, 431 A.2d 1274 (Del. Ch. 1981); Gimbel, 
316A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974). 
12. See generally WARD ET AL., supra note 5, § 271.3. 
13. Throughout this Note, I will refer to this hypothetical transaction as a "§ 271 subsidiary 
asset sale." In addition, I will refer to similar transactions that involved non-Delaware corporations 
as "subsidiary asset sale" transactions. 
14. J.P. Griffin Holding Corp. v. Mediatrics, Inc., No. 4056, 1973 Del. Ch. LEXIS 153, at *5 
(Jan. 30, 1973). 
15. Id. 
16. No. 13045, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 272, at *26--27 (Dec. 30, 1993). The Leslie court did 
note, however, the possibility that a vote by shareholders of the parent would be required if the court 
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A more recent case, however, cast doubt on this technical statutory in­
terpretation by the Delaware courts. In Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger 
International, Inc., Vice Chancellor Strine viewed the defendant corpora­
tion's argument that the section 271 subsidiary asset sale did not implicate a 
vote by its shareholders with a healthy amount of skepticism. 1 1  He cautioned 
against a strict, technical statutory construction of section 271, because of 
the widespread phenomenon of public companies indirectly holding all of 
their operating assets through subsidiaries. 18 Vice Chancellor S trine worried 
that such a reading of section 271 "would, as a practical matter, render [sec­
tion] 271 an illusory check on unilateral board power at most public 
companies." 1 9  Ultimately, he decided to leave the section 271 subsidiary as­
set sale issue unresolved,20 but his brief discussion raises concerns and 
leaves open the possibility that a court could enjoin a section 271 subsidiary 
asset sale without approval from shareholders at the parent level. 
On its face, this section 271 subsidiary asset sale issue may seem a nar­
row, technical issue, but its relevance is becoming increasingly important. 
As noted by Professor Melvin Eisenberg, "a significant portion of the coun­
try's business assets is now held, not only by corporations, but by massive 
subsidiary corporations-megasubsidiaries. As a result, ultimate ownership 
of business assets is often not only once but twice or more removed from the 
assets themselves."2 1  The growing and widespread practice of corporations 
placing their assets under subsidiaries supports the need for resolution of the 
section 271 subsidiary asset sale issue discussed in the hypothetical above. 
Without certainty on what votes are required to authorize such transactions, 
certain corporations are less likely to pursue asset sales through their sub­
sidiaries-despite their potentially beneficial, value-creating nature-and 
instead sell through the parent. Moreover, when corporations do choose to 
effectuate asset sales through their subsidiaries, litigation is likely to arise 
between parent shareholders and the parent corporation. These potential 
adverse effects could create significant costs that ultimately harm share­
holders of corporations in Delaware. As such, determination of which 
shareholders are entitled to a vote to authorize a sale of substantially all of 
the parent corporation's assets held under a subsidiary is critical. This Note 
aims to address and resolve this issue. 
concluded that the subsidiary functioned merely as the "instrumentality" of the parent in effecting 
the asset transaction. Id. at *24-25. 
17. 858 A.2d 342, 348 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. (explaining that because " the policy implications of ruling on [defendant corpora­
tion]'s technical defense are important, prudence counsels in favor of deferring a necessarily hasty 
decision on the interesting question presented."). 
2 1. Eisenberg, supra note I, at 1577. Eisenberg argues that this phenomenon of mcgasub­
sidiaries threatens shareholder voting rights and as a result, "the right to vote the subsidiary's stock 
in these transactions either inheres in the parent and is exercisable by the body of the parent's share­
holder, or passes through the parent directly to the parent's shareholders." Id. at 1588-89. 
Additionally, with the advent and use of triangular merger structures, assets are more frequently 
placed at the subsidiary level. See infra Section II.B for a discussion of triangular mergers. 
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This Note argues that a parent shareholder vote is not implicated under 
section 27 1 when a parent corporation effectuates a sale of substantially all 
of its assets held under a subsidiary. Part I examines a number of different 
corporate law legal regimes, including Delaware's, and concludes that with­
out clear legislative direction, a parent shareholder vote in the context of the 
hypothetical transaction is not necessary and contrary to a number of princi­
ples integral to corporate law and its application. Part II then specifically 
addresses the non-statutory interpretation aspects of Delaware corporate law 
as they relate to this issue. Section II.A reviews the separate corporate exis­
tence doctrine and its applicability to this particular issue. The doctrine 
strongly supports the conclusion that a shareholder vote at the parent level is 
unnecessary. Section 11.B considers other form-over-substance transactions, 
such as triangular mergers and de facto mergers, which Delaware courts 
have condoned despite their indirect, adverse effects on shareholder rights. 
Finally, Section 11.C engages in a brief fiduciary duty analysis establishing 
that the fiduciary duties owed by directors to shareholders provide adequate 
protection to shareholders in the context of a section 27 1 subsidiary asset 
sale. Section Il.C then concludes that a section 27 1 transaction effectuated 
by a subsidiary and voted on by the parent corporation and not the parent's 
shareholders is entitled to the presumptive protection of the business judg­
ment rule. 
I. EXAMINING DIFFERENT CORPORATE LAW REGIMES AND 
THEIR APPROACHES TO SUBSIDIARY ASSET SALES 
In considering the section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale issue, Part I provides 
an overview of a number of significant state corporate law regimes and how 
their legislatures and courts have resolved this particular issue. In the con­
text of this brief analysis, the states that do require a parent shareholder vote 
to authorize the sale of substantially all of the parent corporation's assets 
held under its subsidiary have done so by following explicit legislative lan­
guage provided in the relevant statute. Without clear legislative direction, 
courts, such as New York's, have shown reluctance in requiring a parent 
shareholder vote. 
The discussion in Part I demonstrates an overall consistency between 
different corporation law regimes, with courts using strict statutory interpre­
tation, focusing on statutory language and plainly interpreting the language. 
This approach of strict statutory interpretation promotes definiteness and 
certainty in the law, which invariably enables corporations to better plan 
based on statutory language. Delaware is no exception to this approach. In 
fact, as discussed below, the Delaware courts have clung to the notions of 
certainty when interpreting the DGCL. This Part provides support for why 
strict statutory interpretation, the general interpretative approach, s hould 
also apply to the section 27 1 context. 
Section I.A analyzes the canons of interpretation used by Delaware 
courts and finds that when a statute's meaning is simple and clear, it should 
be interpreted as such. Thereafter, Section LB examines New York corporate 
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Jaw, which similar to Delaware corporate law, does not provide for explicit 
directives on the subsidiary asset sale issue. Section LC then considers other 
corporate law regimes that require a shareholder vote at the parent level be­
cause the respective legislatures have drafted explicit statutory language 
requiring such a vote. Considering these differing approaches, Part I con­
cludes that without explicit direction from its legislature, Delaware courts 
must not, through interpretation, create a second requirement of voting at 
the parent shareholder level. 
A. A Literal and Technical Approach to Statutory Interpretation 
The forthcoming analysis in this Section reveals two dominant princi­
ples of statutory interpretation in Delaware. First and foremost, the 
Delaware Supreme Court has repeatedly provided that if statutory language 
is plain and simple, it should be interpreted as such. Second, if the language 
invites interpretation from a court, the court should interpret the statute with 
the objective of effectuating legislative intent. This can be done by consider­
ing both legislative history and preliminary statements made by the 
Delaware Legislature. 
The plain meaning of the words of section 27 1 of the DGCL should pre­
vail and not require a parent shareholder vote. The pertinent words relating 
to this issue of section 27 1 subsidiary asset sales are "when and as author­
ized by a resolution adopted by the holders of a majority of the outstanding 
stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon."22 The phrase "the holders 
of a majority of the outstanding stock" could mean the actual holder of the 
subsidiary's stock, the parent corporation, or the ultimate beneficiaries, the 
shareholders of the parent corporation. Answering this question ultimately 
depends on the approach of statutory interpretation taken by a court. By 
canons of interpretation used by Delaware courts, the words of a statute 
should be followed when a statute's meaning is simple and clear. 
The Delaware courts' general approach to statutory interpretation is to 
accord statutory language its plain meaning, if possible. 23 In the context of 
interpreting the Medical Malpractice Act under Delaware, the Supreme 
Court of Delaware in Sostre v. S wift emphasized that "[i]t is well settled that 
'[s]tatutory language, where possible, should be accorded its plain meaning.' 
Moreover, when a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no need for 
statutory interpretation.''24 Hence, if a statute's language is unequivocal, a 
court should interpret the statute according to its plain and simple meaning. 
This approach essentially ensures the enactment and implementation of leg­
islative directives provided in the statutory provisions. 
22. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
23. Sostre v. Swift, 603 A.2d 809, 813 (Del. 1992). 
24. Id. (citations omitted). Although the case did not implicate corporate law, a Court of 
Chancery court cited Sostre to support the conclusion that "[ w ]hen the language of the statute is 
clear and unambiguous there is no need for statutory interpretation." In re Home Shopping Network, 
Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 12956, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 80, at *35-36 (May 19, 1993). 
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Sostre is not an outlier case and is consistent, in fact, with the Supreme 
Court of Delaware's repeated insistence on the importance of interpreting 
statutory language, where possible, to accord the language its plain mean­
ing. For example, in State of Delaware v. Lillard, the Court dealt with an 
employment related issue. It explained, like the Sostre court, that 
"[s]tatutory language, where possible, should be accorded its plain mean­
ing."25 The Court also noted that when a Delaware court is forced to 
interpret a statute, it should interpret the relevant statute "so as to give effect 
to the intent of the legislature."26 This approach implies that when the legis­
lative intent is not patently obvious because of the plain nature and 
simplicity of the statutory language, a court should strive to incorporate the 
legislative intent behind a provision. Courts can determine this intent by 
examining legislative history and preliminary statements made by the legis­
lature. 27 
Similarly, in Silverbrook Cemetery Co. v. Department of F inance of New 
Castle County, the Court refused to infuse statutory interpretation or con­
struction. The Court held that "(b]ecause [section] 1 05 [the relevant 
provision] is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for statutory interpre­
tation or construction."28 Further, the Court chided the lower court by 
explaining that it "erred by engaging in an interpretation of [section] 1 05" 
when such an exercise of interpretation was unnecessary and contravened 
the legislative intent demonstrated in the clarity of the provision's lan­
guage.29 Synthesizing this body of case law reveals two dominant principles 
of statutory interpretation in Delaware. First, if statutory language is plain 
and simple, the Delaware Supreme Court will interpret it such. Second, if 
the language requires interpretation, the court should interpret the statute 
with the objective of effectuating legislative intent, considering both legisla­
tive history and preliminary statements made by the Delaware Legislature. 
The mandate of interpreting statutes in a simple and literal fashion when 
the statutory language is plain and clear is heightened in the context of in­
terpreting corporate law.30 In Speiser v. Baker, Chancellor Allen explained 
this edict: "[t]he utility of a literal approach to statutory construction is par­
ticularly apparent in the interpretation of the requirements of our 
corporation law [Delaware General Corporation Law ]-where both the 
statute itself and most transactions governed by it are carefully planned and 
25. 531A.2d 613,617 (Del. 1987). 
26. Id. In directing Delaware courts to consider the intent of the legislature in interpreting a 
statute, the Court noted that "[l]egislative history and preliminary statements, such as the preamble, 
can often aid in statutory construction." Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Silverbrook Cemetery Co. v. Dep't of Fin., 449 A.2d 241, 242 (Del. 1982). 
29. See id. 
30. See Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor Allen 's Jurisprudence and the Theory of Corporate 
Law, 17 DEL J. CORP. L. 683, 708-09 (1992) (discussing Chancellor Allen's approach to interpret­
ing Delaware corporate law). The author notes that Chancellor Allen has expressed "his belief that 
the purpose of modem state corporation law statutes-i.e., 'the facilitation of corporation formation 
and operation' -is best served by a literal interpretation of the terms of such statutes." Id. at 708. 
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result from a thoughtful and highly rational process."31 Corporations 
(through their board of directors and advisors) take great efforts to structure 
their transactions in accordance with the relevant law, hoping to reduce the 
likelihood of future disputes and litigation. They look to corporate law for 
guidance. Therefore, when statutory language appears to be clear and plain, 
corporations will act accordingly. A court conjuring up an unreasonable and 
non-literal interpretation will disrupt the planning of corporations,32 thus 
raising transaction costs. Ultimately, these higher transaction costs are trans­
ferred to shareholders. 
Chancellor Allen's loyalty to literal interpretation is not without compel­
ling rationale. As he notes, a court should interpret statutory language with 
"a sensitivity to the importance of the predictability of that law. That sensi­
tivity causes [Delaware] law, in that setting, to reflect an enhanced respect 
for the literal statutory language."33 An "enhanced respect" for literal inter­
pretation better promotes predictability and certainty, which allows for 
corporations to better plan and act.34 Having established this framework, 
Chancellor Allen explained what a literal interpretation entails. He stated 
that a court, when considering the meaning of plain and simple statutory 
language, should accord the language its "usual and customary meaning to 
persons familiar with this particular body of law."35 Hence, the words "enti­
tled to vote," which were at issue in the case, should mean what those 
familiar with the DGCL expect them to mean.36 
In supporting Chancellor Allen's approach, Professor Stephen Massey 
argues that two features of corporate law and practice require literal inter­
pretation by the courts. 37 First, as discussed above, corporate transactions are 
most often the result of careful, thoughtful planning by sophisticated par­
ties.38 Therefore, if the parties intended to avoid the literal statutory 
meanings, they would contract accordingly. Second, "if the knowledgeable 
and experienced drafters of the [DGCL] had intended [a provision] to be 
construed in some way other than the literal [meaning], they would have 
used language that explicitly accomplished that objective."39 Hence, the pri-
31. 525A.2d 1001, 1008 (Del.Ch. 1987) (ernphasis added). 
32. Massey, supra note 30, at 708 (quoting William T. Allen, Competing Conceptions of the 
Corporation in American Law, Address at Rocco J. Tresolini Lecture in Law, Lehigh University 2 
(Oct. 29, 1990) (noting that corporation law's purpose is "the facilitation of corporation formation 
and operation" (emphasis added))). 
33. Speiser, 525 A.2d at 1008. 
34. See id. 
35. Id. 
36. See id. In this particular case, Chancellor Allen ultimately rejected the literal argument 
posited by the plaintiff. He noted that a related phrase to "entitled to vote" implicated in § 160 of the 
DGCL was not "a technically precise term whose literal meaning is clear," thus "requir[ing] inter­
pretation." Id. 
37. Massey, supra note 30, at 709. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
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mary onus of providing corporate law directives on statutory interpretation 
matters is on the Delaware Legislature, rather than the courts. In addition, 
literal interpretation placates corporate law's need for certainty, which helps 
to drive the objective of predictability in the law.40 
The approach of literal interpretation applies to much of Delaware's 
corporate law. For example, as demonstrated in a later opinion by Chancel­
lor Chandler, literal interpretation extends to section 203. The statutory 
matter at issue was whether a partial tender offer is a "business combina­
tion," thus implicating section 203.41 Prior to delving into what a "business 
combination" entailed, the Chancellor stated that "[o]f greatest importance 
in statutory interpretation is the plain language of the statute itself. When the 
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous there is no need for statu­
tory interpretation."42 Because the definition of "business combination" 
under section 203( c) did not include partial tender offers, Chancellor Chan­
dler ultimately concluded that a partial tender offer did not fall under the 
scope of "business combination."43 
The Court of Chancery of Delaware has generally evoked the principles 
of literal statutory interpretation to an even greater extent than the Supreme 
Court of Delaware. In the context of a section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale 
transaction, the critical question is who are "the holders of a majority of the 
outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon?',44 The lan­
guage, on its face, is plain and clear. The corporation that is selling its assets 
is the appropriate, constituent corporation. It is the entity that has engaged in 
the transaction and must seek approval from its shareholders. A logical ex­
tension of this determination is that the shareholders of the selling 
corporation are the "holders" under section 27 1 .45 Approval by the majority 
of the shareholders of the parent corporation is not needed, because their 
corporation, the parent corporation, has not engaged in an asset sale and 
they are not the record holders of shares in the subsidiary corporation.46 
Thus, a l iteral interpretation leads a rational reader of section 27 1 to con­
clude that a section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale transaction does not implicate 
a shareholder vote at the parent level. Concluding otherwise would reject the 
40. Id. Also, see infra Section LC and accompanying footnotes for a discussion on the im­
portance of certainty in corporate law, and more specifically Delaware corporate law. 
41. In re Home Shopping Network, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 12956, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
80 (May 19, 1993). 
42. Id. at *35 (emphasis added). 
43. Id. at *36-38. The Chancellor engaged in a lengthy discussion and considered legislative 
history because parts of § 203 were not clear and unambiguous on their face. Id. at *40. 
44. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (a) (2006). 
45. See id. As discussed above in the Introduction, in J.P. Griffin Holding Corp. v. Medi­
atrics, Inc. , the Court of Chancery held that the only vote required was the vote of "the record 
holder of all of the shares" of the selling subsidiary corporation. No. 4056, 1973 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
153, at *5 (Jan. 30, 1973). Because the defendant corporation was the record holder of all of the 
shares of its subsidiary and voted all of its shares in favor of the proposed sale, the requirements of 
§ 271 were met. Id. 
46. Rather, the parent corporation is the record holder of the subsidiary's shares. 
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"enhanced respect" for literal interpretation that Chancellor Allen encour­
aged, which would reduce the significant objectives of predictability and 
certainty in corporate law.47 
Even if one assumes that the language of section 27 1 is unclear, the little 
available legislative history48 buttresses the conclusion that a shareholder 
vote by the shareholders of the parent corporation is not required under sec­
tion 27 1 .  The enactment of section 27 1 was meant to add additional 
flexibility in the procedure for a corporation to sell or otherwise dispose of 
its assets.49 Prior to this, the common law provided that neither the directors 
nor shareholders could sell the corporation's assets if a single shareholder 
objected.50 Interpreting an additional voting layer, despite the clear and un­
ambiguous language, would undermine the flexibility section 27 1 was 
meant to provide. Moreover, a 1969 amendment indicates the Legislature's 
intent to restrict voting approval to those "entitled to vote thereon."51 Prior to 
the amendment, section 27 1 required a vote by those "having voting 
power."52 In many ways, the words "voting power" are broader and less pre­
cise than those "entitled to vote." A shareholder of the parent corporation 
may have voting power, in the sense that its voting may indirectly affect 
matters at the subsidiary level. Shareholders of the parent, however, are not 
entitled to vote because they are not holders of the subsidiary's stock. The 
amendment, though not completely dispositive, indicates that the Delaware 
Legislature intended to confine the shareholder vote to those "entitled to 
vote"-those entitled to vote are the holders of the majority of outstanding 
stock of the selling subsidiary corporation, not the shareholders of the parent 
corporation. 
The exercise of statutory interpretation is often difficult and subject to 
the manipulation of a court.53 This shortcoming, however, does not com­
pletely undermine the validity of considering how a provision should be 
interpreted. As discussed above, Delaware, and in particular the Delaware 
Court of Chancery, prefers a literal statutory interpretation approach that 
affords the language of a provision, where possible, its plain and simple 
meaning. Vice Chancellor Strine warned that such an interpretation in the 
context of megasubsidiary and conglomerate corporations may render sec-
47. See Speiser v. Baker, 525 A.2d 1001, 1008 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
48. Unfortunately, legislative history in Delaware is not methodically compiled. Treatises 
provide some brief legislative history. This Note will consider these scant pieces of information in 
supporting its conclusions. 
49. WARD ET AL., supra note 5, § 271.1. 
50. Id. 
51. 2 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORA­
TIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 271, at X-2-X-3 (3rd ed. 1998 & Supp. 2006). 
52. Id. at X-3. 
53. Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 
371, 376 ("The most compelling and widely discussed concern about the use of legislative history is 
its potential for manipulation. It is often said that one generally finds in the legislative history only 
that for which one is looking."). 
June 2006] Megasubsidiaries and Asset Sales under Section 271 1819 
tion 27 1 irrelevant and an illusory check to board power. 54 Although this 
warning is helpful, the burden of addressing this concern should be placed 
on the Delaware Legislature. Delaware, as the largest and preeminent corpo­
rate law state, has an active legislature that aims to resolve corporate law 
issues as they arise. 55 Therefore, the legislature, not judges, should amend 
section 27 1 to address this concern of disenfranchising shareholders, if nec­
essary. In fact, the legislature has refrained from amending section 27 1 ,  
despite the existence of J.P. Griffin Holding Corp. v. Mediatrics, Inc., in 
which the court held that the "holders" under section 27 1 were the parent 
corporation, which held all of the shares of the subsidiary. 56 In essence, the 
Delaware Legislature by remaining dormant on this issue may have assented 
to the holding of the J.P Griffin court and deemed the result appropriate. As 
such, when a court reviews a section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale, it should re­
quire a shareholder vote only by the shareholders of the subsidiary, normally 
the parent corporation. 
B .  Without Explicit Uinguage, Requiring a Vote by Parent Shareholders 
ls Contrary to Corporate La,w Objectives 
New York courts have held that a subsidiary asset sale under New York's 
corporate law does not require a parent shareholder vote. Although the hold­
ings of other state courts are not binding in Delaware, they often provide 
some guidance on certain issues that are either of first impression or unre­
solved. For example, in J.P. Griffin Holding Corp. v. Mediatrics, Inc., the 
Court of Chancery of Delaware, in concluding that only the record holder of 
all shares of the subsidiary selling the assets was required to vote, cited a 
New York state court decision that previously dealt with the subsidiary asset 
sale issue. 57 
Under New York law, the analogous provision to section 27 1 is section 
909 of the New York Business Corporation Law, which provides that a "sale, 
lease, exchange or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of 
a corporation . . .  shall be authorized . . .  [when, among other required pro­
cedures] the shareholders shall approve such sale, lease, exchange or other 
disposition . . .  by vote at a meeting of shareholders . . .  of two-thirds of all 
54. Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int'l, Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 348 (Del. Ch. 2004). Although the 
concern is legitimate, it is not novel and is implicated in other areas, as well. As discussed in Section 
11.B, corporations often effectuate mergers through subsidiaries via a triangular merger structure to 
obviate the need for shareholder approval of the parent shareholders. See infra Section 11.B. Despite 
this effect, the courts have condoned this form of transaction and have refrained from interpreting 
§ 251, the relevant merger statute, in a way to require a vote by the shareholders of the parent corpo­
ration, whose subsidiary is merging. Hollinger, 858 A.2d at 348. 
55. See Wells M. Engledow, Handicapping the Corporate Law Race, 28 lowA J. CORP. L. 
143, 161 (2002). 
56. No. 4056, 1973 Del. Ch. LEXIS 153, at *5 (Jan. 30, 1973). 
57. Id. (citing Cross Props., Inc. v. Brook Realty Co., 322 N.Y.S.2d 773 (App. Div. 1971) 
(limiting the vote of shareholders to the record holders of the shares)). 
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outstanding shares entitled to vote thereon." 58 In Cross Properties, Inc. v. 
Brook Realty Co., the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, of New York was 
called upon to interpret this section of the statute in attempting to determine 
"whether under New York law a sale of all or substantially all the assets of a 
New York corporation, which is essentially the wholly owned subsidiary of 
a twice or thrice removed foreign corporation, must be approved by the ul­
timate beneficial owners, that is, two thirds of the shareholders of the 
ultimate parent corporation." 59 Similar to Vice Chancellor Strine's recogni­
tion of corporations placing their assets under subsidiaries,6() the New York 
court noted the trend of "conglomerate corporate enterprises and so-called 
megasubsidiaries," which undoubtedly results in some dilution of share­
holder voting power.6 1  This dilution of shareholder power, however, did not 
compel the court to read into the statutory language of section 909 to require 
a shareholder vote by the ultimate beneficiary owners, the shareholders of 
the parent corporation.62 The court, rather, chose to interpret the word 
"shareholders" in section 909 under its plain language by concluding that 
"'shareholders' referred to in paragraph (3) [of section 909] are the 'share­
holder[s] of record' " and not the shareholders of the parent corporation of 
the subsidiary selling the assets.63 In following this strict interpretation, the 
court deferred to the New York Legislature and placed the burden on the 
legislature to make any sort of requirement of a parent shareholder vote ex­
plicit.64 
The Cross Properties, Inc. court's choice not to expand the voting re­
quirement of section 909 to include a vote by shareholders of the parent 
corporation is justified not only on statutory interpretation grounds, as dis­
cussed above, but also on the basis of promoting certainty and definiteness 
in corporate transactions. In defending its holding, the court explained the 
potential consequences of holding otherwise: "Such a construction would 
jeopardize the definiteness required for the orderly transaction of corporate 
affairs and would substantially impair the marketability of [the assets] held 
by corporate subsidiaries by making the necessity for approval a complex 
58. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 909 (McKinney 2003). Unlike § 271 of the DGCL. § 909 re­
quires a two-thirds vote of all outstanding shares. Section 271 only requires an affirmative vote by 
the majority of all outstanding shares. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (2006). 
59. Cross Props., Inc., 322 N.Y.S.2d at 779. 
60. Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int'I., Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 348 (Del. Ch. 2004 ). 
6 1. 322 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (recognizing "that utilization of pyramiding corporations often 
results in the dilution or denial of many shareholder prerogatives"). 
62. Id. Interestingly enough, the court explicitly stated in its opinion that the trend of devel­
oping corporate conglomerates and holding companies adversely affects shareholder rights and 
prerogatives. Despite this noted consequence, the court refrained from infusing judicial paternal 
protection to shareholders. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. The court emphasized that megasubsidiaries and alike existed before § 909 was 
amended by the New York Legislature in 1962. Despite this existence, the Legislature chose not to 
amend § 909 to require a vote by parent shareholders in a subsidiary asset sale scenario. Id. One can 
construe not amending § 909 as a form of legislative assent. See id. 
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question of fact."65 In other words, the importance of certainty and definite­
ness in corporate matters, in this case, trumped the consideration of dilution 
of shareholder voting power. 66 Had the court interpreted the statute other­
wise, the methodology of corporate statutory law interpretation would lose 
certainty. With lesser certainty on the voting issue, subsidiaries would have 
greater difficulty in effectuating asset sales.6 7  Such difficulty would likely 
impede certain value-creating sales, which would ultimately hurt sharehold­
ers by not maximizing shareholder value.6 8  
The policy consideration of promoting definiteness in corporate matters 
through predictable statutory interpretation has similar applicability under 
Delaware law. Like the New York statute, section 27 1 's language, if inter­
preted plainly, does not require a vote by shareholders of a parent 
corporation. Without explicit direction from the Delaware Legislature, 
Delaware courts should be reluctant to infuse an additional layer of share­
holder voting. Muddying the interpretation of section 27 1 will reduce the 
certainty of Delaware corporate law interpretation.69 With less certainty, cor­
porations and their boards of directors will naturally act overly cautious and 
spend valuable resources in attempting to transact in an environment of less 
• 70 certamty. 
C .  Explicit Statutory Language Allows for a Parent Shareholder Vote While 
Still Fostering an Environment of Certainty and Definiteness 
Unlike New York law, New Jersey law and the Model Business Corpora­
tion Act both provide explicit language that shareholder approval in the 
context of a subsidiary asset sale constitutes a vote by the shareholders of a 
65. Id. at 780 (emphasis added). 
66. Later in the opinion, the court did note that fiduciary duties may provide shareholders 
with adequate protections. Id. at 781 ("A sale thus known to be opposed by the majority of the 
shareholders of the parent (although approved by the directors of the subsidiaries) might constitute a 
breach of fiduciary obligation")). Later in this Note, I discuss how the duties of loyalty and care 
under Delaware law provide adequate assurances that the parent corporation and its directors will 
not act against the interests of shareholders in effectuating § 271 subsidiary asset sales. See infra 
Section 11.C. 
67. See Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. W hite, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study 
of Investors' Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CAL. L. REv. 551, 569 (1987) (stating 
generally that "the law's certainty and predictability will reduce transaction costs and facilitate 
consummation of mergers that presumably benefit the corporation and its shareholders"). 
68. See id. 
69. See infra Section LC where I anchor the policy considerations of certainty and definite­
ness in Delaware case law. Because Delaware is the state where many corporations incorporate, the 
Delaware courts have placed great emphasis on interpreting laws in a method that promotes cer­
tainty, which better enables corporations to plan and transact accordingly. 
70. One could argue that granting directors discretion over § 271 subsidiary asset sales in­
creases agency costs and may encourage directors to strip the corporation of its assets, which could 
destroy shareholder value and ultimately result in a higher cost of capital in the public markets. Such 
an argument, however, fails to consider the fiduciary duties imposed on directors by Delaware law, 
namely the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. See infra Section 11.C for a discussion on how these 
duties provide adequate protection to shareholders. 
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parent corporation. Section l 4A: 1 0-1 1 of the New Jersey Corporation Act is 
the sale of assets provision and requires a shareholder vote approving the 
sale of all or substantially all of a corporation's assets. 11 The statute further 
states that "[t]he sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all, or substan­
tially all, the assets of one or more subsidiaries of a corporation . . .  shall be 
treated as a disposition within the meaning of subsection 1 4A:1 0- l l ( l) if 
the subsidiary or subsidiaries constitute all, or substantially all, the assets of 
the corporation." 72 The inclusion of this additional subsection in section 
1 4A: 1 0- l l ensures that if a wholly owned subsidiary comprises all or sub­
stantially all of the assets of a parent corporation, the sale by the subsidiary 
of its assets is treated as a sale by the parent. 73 In essence, the New Jersey 
statute explicitly eliminates the separate corporate existence of a parent's 
subsidiary in the context of a subsidiary asset sale. In terms of shareholder 
approval, a sale by a subsidiary of the parent is like a sale by the parent. 
The New Jersey approach of viewing a subsidiary asset sale as an asset 
sale by the parent corporation aligns with the language provided in the 
Model Business Corporation Act. Section 1 2.02(h) of the Act states that 
"[t]he assets of a direct or indirect consolidated subsidiary shall be deemed 
the assets of the parent corporation for the purposes of this section [section 
1 2, which is the section for disposition of assets]" 74 Again, the approach is to 
treat the subsidiary and the parent as one entity thus requiring a vote by the 
shareholders of the parent corporation. This approach ensures that share­
holders are entitled to vote on the sale of substantially all of the assets of 
their corporation, whether placed under a subsidiary or not. 
The dangers and concerns of interpreting the statute to provide addi­
tional shareholder protections do not exist, because the New Jersey statute 
and the Model Business Corporation Act are both explicit in their estab­
lishment of a vote by shareholders of the parent corporation. This explicit 
direction maintains certainty and definiteness in interpretation while still 
requiring a parent shareholder vote. 75 
Despite the fact that the New Jersey/Model Business Corporation Act 
and New York approaches reach different results, they both ensure certainty 
and definiteness, which is likely to encourage and facilitate corporate trans­
actions. 76 This certainty will likely reduce the transaction costs of 
subsidiaries selling their assets, thereby increasing the value gained by sub­
sidiaries in exchange for the assets they sell. 
In considering this comparative analysis, section 27 1 of the DGCL most 
resembles New York's section 909 in that both statutes do not provide for 
71. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:IO-l I (West 2003). 
72. Id. 
73. JOHN R. MACKAY II, NEW JERSEY BUSINESS CORPORATIONS AND 0rHER BUSINESS 
ENTITIES § 9-5 (3d. ed. 2005). 
74. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 12.02(h) (2002). 
75. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
76. See Weiss & White, supra note 67. 
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treatment of a subsidiary asset sale as a sale by the parent. Following the 
New York interpretation ensures that Delaware courts refrain from creating 
additional voting requirements that are not explicitly provided for in the 
statutory language. Moreover, interpreting "holders of a majority of the out­
standing stock" to mean the record holders of the shares of the selling entity, 
which in the case of a subsidiary asset sale would be the subsidiary, pro­
motes greater certainty in the Delaware corporate law regime. This 
enhanced value ultimately inures to the benefit of the shareholders of the 
• 7 7  parent corporation. 
The relevance and influence of policy considerations of "certainty" and 
"definiteness" under Delaware law are not limited to the discussions and 
articles of academics. 7 8 Rather, the Delaware courts have mentioned the im­
portance of such considerations in determining the outcome of cases. For 
example, in Stroud v. Grace, the Supreme Court of Delaware considered the 
scope of the duty of disclosure by the board of directors in connection with 
proposed charter amendments. 79 In reviewing the trial court's extension of 
the duty of disclosure, the court emphasized that "[i]t is important that there 
be certainty in the corporation law."80 This consideration of certainty drove 
the court to conclude that the board had no duty to disclose beyond the re­
quirements provided on the face of the relevant statute. 8 1  Certainty in 
interpreting the relevant DGCL statute compelled the court to dismiss the 
plaintiffs' arguments against the defendant board of directors. 82 
Certainty in interpreting corporate law provides more bright-line tests, 
which creates a more conducive and efficient transactional environment for 
corporations. Corporations are more likely to transact, and more specifically 
in this context, sell and buy assets when they know with greater certainty the 
required approvals that must be attained. Furthermore, with greater cer­
tainty, the chances of litigation are substantially reduced, thus saving 
corporations significant money in litigation costs. The more efficient trans­
actional market and reduced litigation costs all ultimately lead to greater 
shareholder value. 83 
Establishing that certainty is an important consideration reinforces this 
Note's central argument that a board of directors authorizing a section 27 1 
subsidiary asset sale need not attain shareholder approval from the 
77. Id. 
78. For a few examples, see Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of 
Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL Srno. 257 (1974); Werner Z. Hirsch, Reducing Law's Uncertainty 
and Complexity, 21 UCLA L. REv. 1233 ( 1974); and Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An 
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). 
79. 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992). 
80. Id. at 87 (emphasis added). 
8 1. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities 
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 572 (explaining that litigation costs, such as settlement pay­
ments, ultimately lead to "destruction of shareholder value"). 
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shareholders of the parent corporation. Section 27 1 's language on its face 
only requires a vote by the "the holders of a majority of the outstanding 
stock." 84 Since the shareholders of the parent corporation are not the holders 
of the stock of the selling corporation, the subsidiary, their vote is not 
needed. Ruling otherwise would promote uncertainty in legal interpretation, 
which, as established above, is contrary to the edicts of the Delaware courts. 
In the event the Delaware legislature deems a vote at the parent shareholder 
level necessary, amending section 27 1 to adopt explicit legislative 
language 85 requiring a vote by shareholders of the parent corporation is the 
best course of action in that it protects shareholder interests while not 
sacrificing certainty in the DGCL. 
II. CONSIDERING SUBSIDIARY ASSET SALES UNDER DELAWARE LAW 
This Part determines that Delaware's statutory framework doctrinally 
supports a shareholder vote only by the record shareholders of a subsidiary. 
Specifically, Section II.A considers the doctrine of separate corporate exis­
tence, which generally treats a corporation as a separate legal entity 
independent of its shareholders, subsidiaries, and other constituencies. 
Thereafter, Section 11.B catalogues a number of form-over-substance trans­
actions that Delaware courts have repeatedly condoned, despite their 
consequence, whether intended or not, of infringing on shareholder rights. 
This analysis helps to rebut arguments mandating a parent shareholder vote 
in the context of a section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale in order to better protect 
shareholder rights. Finally, Section 11.C engages in a brief fiduciary duty 
analysis that supports the conclusion that traditional fiduciary duties provide 
ample protection for shareholders in the context of section 27 1 subsidiary 
asset sale transactions. 
A. Upholding the Doctrine of Separate Corporate Existence 
As a general matter under Delaware law, a corporation is treated as an 
independent legal entity with a separate existence from its shareholders, 
management, and subsidiaries . 86 Consequently, a parent corporation is sepa­
rate from its subsidiary corporation, and therefore, parent shareholders do 
not have voting rights as they relate to actions conducted by the subsidiary. 
Addressing this issue is critically important, because in essence, disregard­
ing the corporate existence could provide parent shareholders with a claim 
that a section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale transaction mandates a vote by 
shareholders of the parent corporation. Such an argument would ignore the 
84. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. § 27 l (a) (2006). 
85. Explicit legislative language should be similar to the language adopted by New Jersey, 
the Model Business Corporation Act, and other states. See supra Section LC. 
86. DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.02 (2004) 
("Historically, Delaware courts have been meticulous in their recognition of the concept of separate 
corporate existence; there are only a handful of reported cases in which the 'corporate veil' has been 
'pierced.' "). 
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repeated efforts of Delaware courts to recognize and uphold the separate 
legal existence of corporations. s7 
H istorically, Delaware courts have repeatedly and meticulously recog­
nized the concept of separate corporate existence.ss For example, in In re 
Sunstates Corp. Shareholder Litigation, the Court of Chancery of Delaware 
considered the plaintiffs' agency and veil piercing argument.89 It concluded 
that "[f]or the purposes of the corporation law, the act of one corporation is 
not regarded as the act of another merely because the first corporation is a 
subsidiary of the other, or because the two may be treated as part of a single 
economic enterprise for some other purpose."9() The court then limited the 
disregard of separate existence to circumstances of sham and fraud.91 
The Supreme Court of Delaware expressed a similar sentiment about the 
issue.92 It held that a court may only disregard separate corporate existence 
"in the interest of justice, when such matters as fraud, contravention of law 
or contract, public wrong, or where equitable consideration among members 
of the corporation require[s] it."93 Importantly, the circumstances meriting 
disregard did not include the effectuation of a legitimate section 27 1 sub­
sidiary asset sale. Fraud and public policy are compelling exceptions to 
respecting the corporate form of entities, but without indication of fraud, 
courts should continue to preserve the separate existence of corporate enti­
ties. Broadening the exceptions to encompass garden-variety asset sales held 
at the subsidiary level ignores the Delaware courts' overwhelming trend of 
upholding the separate existence of corporate entities while exaggerating the 
intended scope of cases like Leslie. Moreover, the Delaware courts have 
demonstrated that "disenfranchisement" of shareholders in the context of a 
triangular merger is not necessarily a dispositive reason to disregard corpo­
rate existence.94 
Expanding the circumstances that justify the piercing of the corporate 
veil and disregard of separate corporate entities has significant policy impli­
cations. The notion of treating a corporation as an independent legal entity, 
one separate from its shareholders, officers, and subsidiaries, is critical and 
corollary to the concept of limited liability.95 Without separate corporate 
existence, limited liability and its many benefits are threatened. Among 
other things, limited liability facilitates the development of and investment 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. 788 A.2d 530 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
90. Id. at 534. 
91. Id. 
92. Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. Cont'! Oil Co., 239 A.2d 629 (Del. 1968). 
93. Id. at 633. 
94. See infra Section 11.B (discussing triangular mergers). 
95. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1036, 1039 (1991). 
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in public capital markets for stock ownership in companies.96 Additionally, 
without separate corporate existence, certain benefits of shareholders, who 
are also employees of a corporation, may be reduced, because courts and 
other governmental entities may then view corporations and their sharehold­
ers as one.9 7 For example, a shareholder-employee's claim for 
unemployment benefits may be threatened if the corporation was disre­
garded and the shareholder-employee was considered a self-employed 
individuai.9 8  The importance of these policy considerations requires that dis­
regard only occur with clear legislative intent, such as the case in New 
Jersey.99 Therefore, a court should cautiously consider disregarding the sepa­
rate existence of corporate entities, especially when fraud and sham 
circumstances are absent. 
Courts, however, have disregarded the separate existence of a corpora­
tion in certain limited circumstances. For example, in Leslie v. Telephonies 
Office Technologies, Inc., shareholders of the parent corporation argued for 
disregarding the separate existence of the parent corporation and subsidiary 
because they alleged the subsidiary was the alter ego of the parent corpora­
tion, thereby requiring a vote by parent shareholders. 100 As explained in 
Leslie, Delaware courts have long recognized the: 
independent legal existence of corporate entities . . . .  There are certain ex­
ceptions to this rule, however. The use of the corporate form to perpetuate 
a fraud has always constituted such an exception. Furthermore, when 
courts determine that a corporation is, in substance, the mere alter ago, or 
96. Id. at 1 040 (explaining that "[w]ithout limited liability, the risk each investor would face 
in investing in an enterprise would tum in part on the wealth of other investors. Such a system 
would have search costs and other costs which would likely lead investors to make a few larger 
investments where risk-assessment information was accessible, and perhaps entail a reduced level of 
economic activity across the entire economy."). In the article, the author cites to a number of articles 
that support the conclusion that limited liability is critical to the public capital markets, including 
Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 1 1 7 ( 1980) and Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA L. 
REV. 259 ( 1 967). 
97. See Thompson, supra note 95, at 1 04 1 .  Professor Thompson cites two specific cases that 
provide examples of the danger of disregarding separate legal existence. He first cites to Markarian 
v. Califano, 473 F. Supp. 671 (W.D.N.Y. 1 979), in which the court held that the Social Security 
Administration could not pierce the veil of a close corporation to decrease a claimant's eligibility for 
benefits on the grounds that earnings were to be considered as coming from a sole proprietorship. 
Thompson, supra note 95, at 1 04 1  n.30. By preserving the separate existence, the claimant, who was 
a shareholder/employee, was able to claim Social Security benefits. Reaching a different result, in 
Roccograndi v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 1 78 A.2d 786 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1 962), the court 
concluded that the holding shareholder/employees were self-employed and, therefore, ineligible for 
unemployment benefits. Thompson, supra note 95, at 1041 n.3 1 .  In this case, the decision by the 
court ultimately punished shareholders. Analyzing these two cases in conjunction helps to establish 
the risk, from the shareholder perspective, of regularly disregarding the separate existence of corpo­
rations, their shareholders, and their subsidiaries. 
98. Thompson, supra note 95, at 104 1. 
99. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: l0-l l (2003). 
100. No. 1 3045, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 272, at *26-27 (Dec. 30, 1993). 
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instrumentality of its owners, they will in certain instances, deny legal ef­
fect to the otherwise valid creation of a corporate entity. 101 
The Leslie court ultimately denied the motion to dismiss the claim to 
disregard by explaining that the actions of the parent and subsidiary corpo­
rations could justify disregarding their separate existence and treating the 
parent and subsidiary as a single legal entity under the common control of 
h . I02 t e parent corporation. 
Leslie potentially implicates broad issues by opening the door to disre­
garding the separate legal existence of corporations, specifically between 
parent and subsidiary corporations. The following considerations help to 
limit Leslie to its facts and reassure the preservation of the independent legal 
existence doctrine. First, the hesitancy of the court's language is quite ap­
parent. The court inserted a number of critical qualifiers to its statement that 
an instrumentality claim is a viable exception to the recognition of inde­
pendent corporate existence. The court first took great effort to explain that 
"courts have generally recognized the independent legal existence of corpo­
rate entities." io3 Furthermore, even in an instance where "a corporation is, in 
substance, the mere alter ego, or instrumentality of its owners, [courts] will 
in certain instances, deny legal effect . . . .  " 104 The court then concluded its 
discussion on when to disregard the separate corporate existence by empha­
sizing that "more often than not, Delaware courts have upheld the legal 
significance of corporate form, in a corporate-subsidiary complex."105 Al­
though one could deem the court's construction of the alter 
ego/instrumentality exception as potentially expansive, these many limita­
tions and qualifiers help to limit the broad read of the language. 
Additionally, the court's language as dicta, and not a holding, does not pos­
sess the same precedential strength as earlier cases do, which limit the 
disregard of separate corporate existence to the circumstances of fraud or 
evasion of a judicial decree. 106 
A second reason to refrain from broadening the implications of Leslie is 
that it involved a potential oppression of minority shareholders and was not 
a typical instrumentality case. The court noted that plaintiffs alleged that the 
1 0 1 .  Id. at *26-27 (citing Walsh v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 23 1 A.2d 458, 461 (Del. 1953), in 
which the Delaware Supreme Court refused to "decide the general proposition as to when a Dela­
ware law court may disregard the corporate structure"). Interestingly, the "alter ego/instrumentality" 
exception is a more recent development and supported mostly by dicta in Delaware. DREXLER ET 
AL., supro note 86. 
102. See Leslie, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 272 (Dec. 30, 1 993). 
103. Id. at *26. 
1 04. Id. (emphasis added). 
105. Id. at *26-27 (emphasis added). 
1 06. E.g., Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. Cont'! Oil Co., 23 1 A.2d 450, 452-53 (Del. Ch. 1 967) 
("In the absence of fraud, the separate entity of a corporation is to be recognized. This principle has 
been enunciated by all of the courts of this state." (quoting Shaffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 178 
A.2d 3 1 1 ,  3 1 6  (Del. Ch. 1 962), aff'd, 1 87 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962))). The Leslie opinion is also unpub­
lished and therefore does not carry much precedential weight. Leslie, 1 993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 727, at 
* l. 
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defendant shareholders used their control over the parent corporation to con­
trol the subsidiary to help "siphon off assets to themselves [the defendant 
shareholders], at a cost to shareholders."107 This action, the plaintiffs 
claimed, led to the distribution of proceeds to the defendant shareholders to 
the exclusion of minority shareholders. 108 Oppression of minority sharehold­
ers is out of the ordinary and compels a restriction on the reading of Leslie 
as it relates to the doctrine of independent corporate existence, primarily 
because the driving force in Leslie was thwarting oppression of minority 
shareholders and not reshaping the doctrine of independent corporate exis­
tence. The facts also are dissimilar to the circumstances of a typical section 
27 1 subsidiary asset sale transaction, where the subsidiary sells its assets but 
does nothing to siphon off the proceeds. 10') In a customary section 27 1 sub­
sidiary asset sale, the Leslie facts are inapplicable and therefore applying the 
court's dicta directive would be inappropriate. 
In practice, the Delaware courts have chosen to follow the approach of 
In re Sunstates Corp. Shareholder Litigation by limiting the circumstances 
of corporate veil piercing. An empirical study found that as a practical mat­
ter, Delaware courts rarely disregard the separate existence of Delaware 
corporations and their constituencies by piercing the corporate veil, 1 10 par­
ticularly in the context of a public corporation.1 1 1  This practice, though not 
inconsistent with the arguments provided in Leslie, aligns with the past his­
torical stance that protects the separate existence of corporate entities, unless 
evidence of fraud and/or sham intentions is evident. 1 12 
B .  Fann-over-Substance Transactions: Two Illustrative Examples 
A possible argument against the central thesis of this Note is that not re­
quiring a shareholder vote by the shareholders of the parent corporation, the 
ultimate beneficiaries and "true" shareholders, favors form over substance, 
which allows directors of Delaware corporations to engage in asset sales 
without shareholder approval. In response to this argument, it is most impor­
tant to highlight that Delaware law often favors form over substance. 1 1 3  This 
107. Leslie, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 272, at *27-28. 
108. Id. at *28. 
109. Leslie is also distinguishable on the basis that it involved interested direc­
tors/shareholders. Id. at *27-28. Because of the existence of a conflict of interests, a court would 
normally ignore the business judgment rule presumption and more diligently scrutinize the decision 
of the directors to sell the company's assets. In contrast, in a typical disinterested § 271 subsidiary 
asset sale transaction, a court would review the directors, decision to sell the assets under the busi­
ness judgment rule presumption. See infra Section Il.C. 
110. Thompson, supra note 95, at 1052-53. Furthermore, "a piercing decision is not less but 
more likely when the shareholder behind the veil is an individual rather than another corporation." 
Id. at 1038 (emphasis added). In our context, we are dealing with a corporation, the parent corpora­
tion, and not an individual, so piercing is less likely. 
111. Id. at 1039. 
112. See Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. Cont'! Oil Co., 239 A.2d 629 (Del. 1968). 
113. Discussing whether normatively a form-over-substance approach is best is not within the 
scope ofthis Note. Such a discussion requires a separate extensive analysis. 
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Section dissects two such examples helping to reaffirm that a form-over­
substance approach in the section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale context is not 
unusual, but rather a norm established by Delaware precedent. 
Delaware's form-over-substance bias is most apparent in the context of 
triangular mergers. Under section 25 1 of the DGCL, two corporations may 
merge into one surviving corporation with the approval of shareholders of 
the two "constituent" corporations. 1 14 Assuming an ordinary stock-for-stock 
merger structure, the shareholders of both the acquiring corporation and the 
target corporation must approve the transaction.I I5 A relatively recent struc­
ture, called a triangular merger, allows for the acquiring corporation to 
eliminate the requirement of attaining its shareholder approval. By using a 
wholly owned subsidiary as the acquiring entity, the "constituent" corpora­
tion becomes the subsidiary and not the parent; therefore, the vote to 
authorize the transaction is required from the shareholders of the subsidiary, 
which is the parent corporation, and not the shareholders of the parent cor-
• 1 16 porat1on. 
The indirect effect of using a triangular merger structure is that the 
shareholders of the parent corporation, the ultimate acquirer, "do not have 
the right to vote on the merger nor are they entitled to appraisal rights"1 17 
since the parent corporation is not a constituent corporation under section 
25 1 (c). 1 18 Both the structure and effect of triangular mergers are analogous 
to those of section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale transactions. Delaware courts 
have, as indicated below, repeatedly upheld the triangular merger structure, 
despite the effects it has had on the rights of parent shareholders. One 
prominent case in which this structure arose and was upheld is Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., where the Delaware Supreme Court dealt 
primarily with the issue of whether the defensive mechanisms adopted by 
Time to protect its friendly merger with Warner were in accordance with the 
Unocal standard.1 19 The Court noted that the reverse triangular merger struc­
ture under "Delaware law did not require any vote by Time shareholders."120 
1 1 4. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 25 1 (c) (2006). The merger must also involve an increase of at 
least 20 percent of the surviving corporation's shares to implicate a vote. Id. 
1 1 5. Id. 
1 1 6. SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, JR., BUSINESS PLANNING FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 1 94-
95 (2d ed. 2001 )  (quoting R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 9.5, 9.7 ( 1988)). 
1 1 7. Id. Generally, under § 262, dissenting shareholders of a constituent corporation are af-
forded appraisal rights as a remedy to a merger. Tit. 8 ,  § 262. 
1 1 8. Tit. 8, § 251 (c). 
1 1 9. 571 A.2d 1 140 (Del. 1989). 
1 20. Id. at 1 146 (emphasis added). Interestingly enough, prior to a hostile bid by Paramount to 
acquire Time, the board of Time had structured the merger as a stock merger, thus implicating a vote 
under New York Stock Exchange rules. See id. Upon the issuance of the hostile bid, the Time board 
restructured the transaction as a cash deal to avoid the New York Stock Exchange voting require­
ment and ensure that shareholders did not possess veto power on the proposed Time-Warner deal 
through their exercise of voting. See id. Despite this, Chancellor Allen held that the Time board did 
not breach its fiduciary duties. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Law 
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1009, 1 1 74 n. 1 82 ( 1 997). 
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In fact, these structures are commonly accepted under Delaware law and 
there is no mention of oppression of shareholder rights. 
Why oppression of shareholder rights would dominate the determination 
of section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale and not a triangular merger is difficult to 
explain or justify. In both structures, the parent corporation effectuates a 
transaction using a subsidiary, which has the effect of denying the parent 
shareholders of voting rights (and in the case of a triangular merger, ap­
praisal rights, too). Upholding triangular mergers while disallowing section 
27 1 subsidiary asset sales without approval by parent shareholders is seem­
ingly inconsistent. As Delaware's treatment of triangular mergers illustrates, 
in the absence of fiduciary duty violations, Delaware upholds the form of a 
transaction despite the substantive adverse effects on certain shareholders' 
rights. Therefore, a section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale should not require 
shareholder approval at the parent corporation level, absent legislative action 
to the contrary. 
A second example of where the Delaware courts have elevated form over 
substance, despite the adverse effects on shareholders, is the de facto merger 
doctrine. In Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., the Supreme Court of Dela­
ware dealt with the issue of whether a proposed section 27 1 asset sale 
followed by a mandatory plan of dissolution and distribution was in fact a 
de facto merger that implicated appraisal rights under section 262. 121 In the 
case, the defendant corporation agreed to an asset sale under section 27 1 in 
exchange for stock in the acquiring corporation. 122 As part of this asset sale, 
the defendant corporation agreed to call a shareholder meeting to approve a 
voluntary liquidation and dissolution, whereby the shares of the acquiring 
corporation would be distributed to the shareholders of the defendant corpo­
ration. 123 In effect, the plaintiff argued that this set of transactions, the asset 
sale and liquidation, accomplished the same result as a merger of the defen­
dant corporation into the acquiring corporation.1 24 
Despite the substance of the transaction, the court denied appraisal 
rights. The court recognized that the "[p]laintiff's contention that this sale 
has achieved the same result as a merger is plainly correct. "125 Most signifi­
cantly, the structure had the effect of denying dissenting shareholders their 
appraisal rights. 126 Despite this recognition, the Court held that "the reor­
ganization here accomplished through [section] 27 1 and a mandatory plan 
of dissolution and distribution is legal."121 The Court justified its position by 
121. 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963). 
122. Id. at 124. 
123. Id. 
1 24. Id. 
125. Id. at 125 (emphasis added). 
126. There are no appraisal rights for dissenting shareholders in a § 271 transaction. DEL 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2006). 
1 27. Hariton, 188 A.2d at 125 ("[The holding of the case] is so because the sale-of-assets 
statute and the merger statute are independent of each other. They are, so to speak, of equal dignity, 
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explaining that the board of the defendant corporation was free to choose 
among the different transaction structures available, and so long as the tech­
nical requirements of that structure were met, the Court must respect the 
form. 12s 
The consequence of denying shareholders their appraisal rights under 
this "de facto merger" transaction did not compel the Court to grant share­
holders appraisal rights. In fact, the Court concluded by noting that its 
conclusion "is not an anomalous result in our corporation law."129 If the form 
of a transaction is properly followed under Delaware law, the courts will 
generally avoid disrupting it regardless of the adverse effects on sharehold­
ers. 
Both the Hariton and Paramount cases are illustrative examples of how 
Delaware courts often elevate form over substance. If a board of directors 
appropriately follows the relevant Delaware form, be it a triangular merger 
or an asset sale followed by dissolution, a Delaware court is likely uphold 
the transaction, despite its adverse effects on shareholders. Similarly, a court 
should uphold a section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale that is effectuated only by 
a vote of the shareholders of the subsidiary, the parent corporation, so long 
as the form requirements are met and there is no violation of fiduciary du­
ties. 
C. Fiduciary Duties: Protection fo r Shareholders of Parent 
Co rporations Engaging in Subsidiary Asset Sales 
Allowing for a section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale transaction to proceed 
without a vote by the shareholders of the parent corporation may seem prob­
lematic to many because of its disenfranchising effect on shareholders. 
Section 27 1 was meant to protect shareholders from a corporation unilater­
ally deciding to sell all or substantially all of its assets, thus changing the 
substance and purpose of the corporation. Although this consideration does 
not prevail in the section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale context, fiduciary obliga­
tions provide shareholders adequate protection from the actions of the board 
of directors in this context. 
As provided by the Delaware courts, directors owe shareholders fiduciary 
duties: the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. 130 In Smith v. Van Gorkom,13 1  
the Delaware Supreme Court explained that directors owe shareholders these 
duties. The duty of care, among other things, includes a duty to be informed, 
"prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably 
and the framers of a reorganization plan may resort to either type of corporate mechanics to achieve 
the desired end. This is not an anomalous result in our corporation law."). 
128. See id. 
129. Id. 
130. WARD ET AL., supra note 5, § 141. The case law discussing fiduciary duties is extensive. 
This Note only engages in a brief analysis of these duties as they relate to a § 271 subsidiary asset 
sale transaction. 
131. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
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available to them."132 A duty of loyalty "embodies not only an affirmative 
duty to protect the interests of the corporation, but also an obligation to re­
frain from conduct which would injure the corporation and its stockholders 
or deprive them of profit or advantage."133 Generally, the more significant 
the subject matter of the decision, the greater is the requirement on directors 
to probe and consider alternatives, in essence, to "perfect" their fiduciary 
duties. 134 
Fiduciary duties similarly protect shareholders in subsidiary asset sales. 
In a section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale transaction, the directors of the parent 
corporation owe the standard fiduciary duties toward their shareholders. As 
such, shareholders are protected from decisions based on gross negligence135 
and/or self-dealing. 136 In the ordinary course, a court will apply the business 
judgment rule presumption that the directors acted honestly and in good 
faith with respect to the section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale transaction . . 37 The 
business judgment rule confers upon the directors a relatively broad amount 
of discretion in selling the assets of the corporation.138 This discretion, how­
ever, will be denied if a court determines that the directors violated any of 
their fiduciary duties to shareholders . . 39 Therefore, a director's grossly and 
uninformed vote to authorize a subsidiary asset sale would be overturned. 
Additionally, a court would reverse a subsidiary asset sale that somehow 
violated the duty of loyalty or, at a minimum, provide shareholders suffi­
cient monetary damages. 
Ultimately, the shareholders of a parent corporation engaging in a sec­
tion 27 1 subsidiary asset sale are provided adequate protection through the 
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. These two fiduciary duties provide base­
line protection for shareholders against actions by the board of directors. 
This protection helps to alleviate any concerns, as noted by Vice Chancellor 
Strine, 140 that shareholders are at the mercy of directors if the courts allowed 
132. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Put another way, "the duty of care 
requires a director, when making a business decision, to proceed with a 'critical eye' by acting in an 
informed and deliberate manner respecting the corporate merits of an issue before the board." Ivan­
hoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987). 
133. Ivanhoe Panners, 535 A.2d at 1345. "Most basically, the duty of loyalty proscribes a 
fiduciary from any means of misappropriation of assets entrusted to his management and supervi­
sion." WARD ET AL., supra note 5, § 141.2.1.1. 
134. See WARD ET AL., supra note 5, § 141. 
135. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (providing that "the concept of gross negligence is also the 
proper standard for determining whether a business judgment reached by a board of directors was an 
informed one"). 
136. Id. at 872. 
137. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 3 16 A.2d 599, 609 (Del. Ch. 1974) (providing that "[t]his pre­
sumption, an important aspect of what has generally come to be known as the 'business judgment 
rule,' has been consistently reaffirmed and broadened with respect to the sale of corporate assets 




140. See Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int'I, Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 348 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
June 2006] Megasubsidiaries and Asset Sales under Section 271 1833 
section 27 1 subsidiary asset sales to proceed without a vote by shareholders 
of the parent corporation. Moreover, holding that a section 27 1 subsidiary 
asset sale does not need approval by parent shareholders preserves the struc­
ture of Delaware corporate law. As in other contexts, Delaware corporate 
law defers to the sound business judgment of directors, who are more so­
phisticated and possess greater expertise than judges; at the same time, the 
standard fiduciary duties of loyalty and care provide adequate safeguards to 
protect shareholders in the event directors violate their duties toward share­
holders. Therefore, arguments of shareholder oppression in the context of a 
section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale are as unconvincing as the argument that 
shareholders, in a hypothetical situation, should have a remedy against di­
rectors for making an informed, good faith business decision to expand 
operations internationally that ultimately failed. 
CONCLUSION 
Many academics and commentators will argue that allowing section 27 1 
subsidiary asset sales to proceed without approval by the shareholders of the 
parent corporation will only contribute to Delaware's continual "race to the 
bottom."141 This critique, however, fails to consider the practical implications 
of creating an additional voting layer at the parent shareholder level. As 
demonstrated in this Note, Delaware aims to promote predictability and cer­
tainty in its law, particularly in the context of its method of interpreting 
corporate law. This predictability and certainty fosters a more conducive 
transactional environment that allows corporations to efficiently and effec­
tively transact. Disrupting this environment should only be done as a last 
resort or explicitly by the Delaware Legislature. Section 27 1 allows for a 
corporation to sell all or substantially all of its assets so long as it attains 
shareholder approval. Logically, a subsidiary selling its assets under section 
27 1 need only attain approval from its shareholders, the parent corporation. 
Holding otherwise threatens the edicts of the Delaware corporate law and 
disturbs the conducive transactional nature of Delaware corporate law. 
141. See Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom " Revisited: Reflections on Recent De­
velopments in Delaware 's Corporation law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 915 (1982) (arguing that recent 
"decisions, although containing much rhetoric about protection of shareholders, will actually oper­
ate to reduce shareholders' welfare" (emphasis omitted)). 
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